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Part I of this book included many excursions into the history of business
cycles, but its focus was on theories and their assessment in light of"stylized
facts" broadly defined. Part II concentrates on problems of history and mea-
surement: How are long-term trends and short-term fluctuations of the econ-
omy related in the available records? What lessons can be learned about the
regularity or irregularity of business cycles? Can macroeconometric models
simulate cyclical behavior of major economic variables, and if so, how and
how well? These questions are addressed in chapters 7, 8, and 9. What fol-
lows is a guide to this set oftopics, again with some extensions.
6.1 fiend-Cycle Decompositions
A frequently used univariate approach to modeling growth and fluctuations
in rising macroeconomic series is to adjust each for seasonal variations, if
relevant, and then represent the nonseasonal series as a sum ofa deterministic
trend and the residual "cyclical" component. For example, the postwar real
GNP would be treated as consisting of an exponential trend and stochastic
deviations arising from cumulation ofrandom shocks. I But it is very unlikely
that a given type of a deterministic trend would persist and prove projectable
over long stretches ofhistorical time, that is, across periods ofgreat technical
and structural changes, wars, booms and depressions, inflation and deflation.
1. Let Q= log real GNP; LnQ, =Q,-n' where L is the lag (backshift) operator; AL= 1- elL-
Q.).2 - ... - QKLK; and E, is white noise. Then
(I) Q, = a +bt+A(L)E"
where the trend (a + bt) is purely deterministic and the shocks affect only the cyclical component.
The effects of each shock would Persist but decline and die out after k Periods (the polynomial
A(L) must satisfy the stationarity and invertibility conditions).
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This is a strong argument against the applicability ofthis trend-stationary (TS)
representation.
In contrast, consider the autoregressive integrated moving-average
(ARIMA) modeling, in which the time series are reduced to stationarity by
differencing and then their autoregressive and moving-average components
are analyzed (Box and Jenkins 1976). Here a purely stochastic difference-
stationary (OS) process is obtained in the presence of an autoregressive (AR)
unit root. 2 In this case, the shocks affect the change in the series in the short
run or transitorily but the level of the series in the long run or permanently.
There is evidence that real GNP and other important economic aggregates
resemble OS processes much more than TS processes (Nelson and Plosser
1982). This was interpreted as lending support to the real business cycle
(RBC) theory on the ground that only real, not monetary, shocks can have
permanent effects. But economic activity is most likely affected by more than
one type ofdisturbance, and some shocks may have long effects, others short
effects. 3
The empirical estimates of the OS process are unsatisfactory in that they
confuse the trend and cyclical movements in series such as real GNP. The
"trends" include not only the secular growth but also most ofwhat is generally
viewed as the "cycle," including major declines. Series that look like OS
could alternatively originate in TS processes with AR roots close to but dis-
tinct from 1.0, and no finite-sample tests can conclusively distinguish be-
tween DS and TS series in such cases. Hence the RBC hypothesis cannot be
validated statistically along these lines (McCallum 1986).
Much more satisfactory trend and cycle estimates have been obtained re-
cently by using unobserved components (UC) models, in which the trend is a
random walk with drift and the cycle consists of deviations from trend that
represent a covariance stationary process (Watson 1986). 4 The UC model for
2. This model replaces (a + bt) in equation (1) with a constant and adds to it a stationary and
invertible ARMA term. A simple example is
(2) (l - L)Qt=dQt=b +(l - 8L)ct,
which is DS for 181 < 1. (For 8 = 1, however, the process is TS; in the case ofb = 0, Q t would
just equal Ct.)
3. A frequent assumption in modern macroeconomics is that demand disturbances have transi-
tory effects that dominate business cycles, whereas supply disturbances have cumulative effects
that dominate the long trends. For estimated decompositions ofoutput and unemployment based
on this premise, see Blanchard and Quah 1989.
4. For example, let T and C denote the trend and cyclical components of output Q, and let eT
and e






Tt = a +Tt _ 1+ e;;
C
t = 8(L)e;.
In the version used for estimation, e; and e;-k are uncorrelated for all k. A more general but also
more difficult to implement version would allow for some correlation between Tt and Ct"185 Trends and Fluctuations
real GNP produced a cyclical component with one-to-one correspondence
with the NBER chronology for 1951-83 (Watson 1986, p. 64). Harvey
(1985), too, presents a general argument and supporting evidence in favor of
"structural" DC modeling.
What emerges from these and other recent studies (Beveridge and Nelson
1981; Stulz and Wasserfallen 1985; Campbell and Mankiw 1987a, 1987b;
Clark 1987) is that changes in macroeconomic activity measured by real GNP,
employment, and industrial production have exhibited a high degree of per-
sistence, not prompt reversals to deterministic time trends, in the United
States and other developed economies. The cyclical component was relatively
strong before World War II and after 1970, and was weak in the early postwar
period ofmild fluctuations, when stochastic trend models performed very well
(but, it is important to note, this is limited evidence coming from annual esti-
mates only).
I interpret these results to mean that trends and cycles interact and cannot
be clearly separated. This agrees with the view that "the business-cycle theo-
rist . . . cannot imitate the business-cycle statistician in merely eliminating
secular trends" (Mitchell 1927, p. 233; see also Burns and Mitchell 1946, p.
270). The interdependence ofgrowth and fluctuations (discussed from the his-
torical point of view in chapter 7) is consistent with a number of theories,
endogenous and exogenous, and does not necessarily preclude an active role
for money and credit orfavor supply over demand factors in the origination of
business cycles.
6.2 An Illustration: Trends and Cycles in Real GNP
Even though the trend-cycle decompositions thus appear to be basically
problematic, working with detrended series is considered necessary for some
analytical purposes. This includes in particular the study of "growth cycles,"
that is, sequences of significant retardations and accelerations, or phases of
below-average and above-average growth rates in indicators ofaggregate eco-
nomic activity. In the initial stages of the development of growth cycle mea-
sures and chronologies, long-term moving averages were experimentally used
as estimates offlexible but rising trends, with a fixed span of75 months being
favored (Mintz 1969, 1972). Later, improved results were found to be pro-
vided by the phase-average trend technique (Boschan and Ebanks 1978; Klein
and Moore 1985, ch. 2). Another alternative is the Whittaker-Henderson type
of trend curve used as a low-frequency filter in Hodrick and Prescott 1980.
Detrending in this form has been applied in several RBC studies, despite the
claim of the underlying theory to explain growth along with cycles (for a
criticism along these lines, see King and Rebelo 1989).
Figure 6.1 compares three different trend estimates for quarterly data on
GNP in constant dollars, 1948-90, plotted separately but to the same logarith-
mic scales. The trends are shown as solid curves; the underlying RGNP data
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.187 Trends and Fluctuations
upward at a constant rate ofgrowth equal to 0.84% per quarter (or 3.42% per
year). The second trend is nonlinear, based on the phase-average method of
combining moving averages and interpolations between mean values of the
series in its successive business cycle phases. The third trend, introduced and
discussed in Watson 1986, is stochastic and based on an unobserved compo-
nents representation ofthe process describing the RGNP data. Here log RGNP
is treated as a sum of the trend, modeled as a random walk with drift, and a
residual, modeled as a covariance stationary process and labeled the cyclical
component. In the general case, the two components are partially correlated. 5
The deterministic log-linear trend is, ofcourse, free ofany cyclical or other
short-term movements. The phase-average trend is clearly much more flexible
and fits the same data much more clearly; it too is designed so as not to contain
any cyclical elements. In contrast, the stochastic trend flattens in several
recessions (1953-54, 1973-75, 1981-82) and even declines in some (1957-
58,1960).
The specific-cycle peaks and troughs in the level ofreal GNP are identified
by filled dots in figure 6.1. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the
cyclical declines in the total output ofthe economy so measured and the busi-
ness contractions as dated by NBER, which are represented by the grid ofthe
vertical broken lines (peaks, P) and solid lines (troughs, T). But on a few
occasions timing discrepancies can be observed, where the center month of
the real GNP turning quarter precedes the monthly NBER reference date. The
latter, it should be recalled, is based on the consensus of roughly coincident
indicators, monthly and quarterly, including measures of real income, sales,
production, and employment. The figure also shows that the recognized chro-
nology of U.S. business cycles does not validate the popular rule of thumb
according to which two consecutive quarterly declines in real GNP denote a
recession. For example, according to the current data, no decline of two or
more quarters occurred in either ofthe two recession years, 1960 and 1980.
Figure 6.2 shows deviations from each of the three trends, again plotted
separately but to the same arithmetic scales, with each trend level equated to
100. The deviations of the data from the log-linear trend are very large much
of the time, especially downward in the late 1940s and on and off in the last
decade, upward in the middle 1960s and early 1970s. It is evident that the
assumption of log-linearity produces a poor trend estimate. The economy
grew much faster in 1948-52 (one recession) than in 1953-60 (three reces-
sions), and again much faster in the 1960s (one long expansion) than in the
1970s and early 1980s (four recessions). The phase-average trend takes these
variations into account, and the deviations from it are relatively small. The
stochastic trend includes many small random movements, so here the devia-
tions are remarkably smooth. They appear to be much more "cyclical" and
5. I am very much indebted to Mark Watson for letting me have his data and programs for both
this univariate trend and also an interesting multivariate trend estimate from King, Plosser, Stock,
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Fig. 6.2 Real GNP: Deviations from log-linear trend (A) and from phase-
average trend (B), 1948-85
Note: Trend level = 100. Broken vertical lines represent growth cycle peaks (P); solid vertical
lines represent growth cycle troughs (T). Dots identify peaks and troughs ofspecific cycles;
crosses identify those turning points that match growth cycle peaks or troughs.
less "irregular" than the deviations from the phase-average trend and, though
smaller, show more similarity to the deviations from the log-linear trend.
The deviations from trend follow a pattern of growth cycles represented in
figure 6.2 by a grid of vertical broken and solid lines, which are respectively
peaks and troughs separating phases of above-normal and below-normal
growth. A comparison of figures 6. 1 and 6.2 confirms that five of nine post-
war business cycle peaks (in 1957, 1969, 1973, 1980, and 1990) were pre-
ceded by growth retardations that lasted from 6 to 17 months. On four occa-
sions, in 1951-52, 1962-64, 1966-67, and 1984-86, the nation's output
decelerated markedly without becoming negative. These are slowdowns that
did not turn into recessions; that is, they belong to those growth cycles that
did not become growth cycles.
The series of deviations from both the log-linear trend and the stochastic
trend show three large waves each, with troughs in the recession years 1949,189 Trends and Fluctuations
1957, 1975, and 1982. The deviations from the better fitting phase-average
trend do not have this configuration.
6.3 How Growth and Fluctuations Interact
The reference cycle analysis of Bums and Mitchell (1946) describes the
movements ofeach time series ofinterest during each business cycle covered.
The average standing ofthe series in each ofnine successive stages ofa cycle
(the initial trough, three successive thirds of the expansion, the peak, three
successive thirds ofthe contraction, and the terminal trough) is expressed as a
percentage of the average level of the series during the entire cycle. That av-
erage level is always equated to 100, so the method eliminates the intercycle
trend but retains the intracycle trend. The historical studies of the National
Bureau analyzed such reference cycle patterns for hundreds of time series in
efforts to identify the prevailing behavior of the variables covered and any
systematic changes in it. This helped to build up ourknowledge ofthe stylized
facts, some ofwhich are summarized in chapter 2, section 2.2, and elsewhere
in part I of this book. The patterns for upward-trending series, which include
most ofthe data on incomes, output, and employment, show strong effects of
secular growth: terminal troughs tend to be higher than the initial troughs, and
the peak and average levels as a rule increase from one cycle to the next. The
few exceptions have occurred in connection with the most severe contractions
and the shortest and mildest expansions.
Since business expansions and contractions vary in length across the differ-
ent cycles, so will the stages into which they are divided. In effect, then, the
NBER analysis proceeds in two units of measurement: business cycle time
and calendar time. The latter is more familiar and probably preferable for
many purposes, including studies of contemporary developments and fore-
casting (the calendar-time lengths of the current phase and cycle are un-
known). But many historical regularities may be better articulated in business
cycle time, for example, leads and lags may vary less across cycles when
expressed in stages and their fractions rather than months. More generally,
business cycle time may be more closely related to "psychological time" (AI-
lais 1966, 1972). Ifevents are perceived to move more slowly in long than in
short cycle phases, then expectations may cover longer chronological time
spans in the former and adjustments may be slower (Friedman and Schwartz
1982, p. 358).
This argument would apply best to a world in which qualitatively much the
same train ofevents would occur in each business cycle, only stretched out in
long phases and compressed in short ones. This is probably often a fair ap-
proximation to reality but far from being a firm rule. Occasionally an expan-
sion is aborted: short and slow, with little net growth; or a contraction is ag-
gravated: long and fast, that is, a severe depression. A long expansion may
also be vigorous much ofthe time, though seldom continuously so.190 Chapter Six
Some RBC models explicitly predict a trade-off between growth and stabil-
ity: when people opt for higher expected returns and accept higher risks, the
result will be faster but also more volatile growth in profits, income, and out-
put (see Black 1987, p. 76). But analogies between individuals and societies
can be misleading, and rules of personal finance need not apply to processes
of aggregate economic activity. Historical data indicate that in periods when
the annual growth rates in U.S. output were on average high (low), their stan-
dard deviations were low (high). Thus in 1903-13, 1923-29, and 1948-69
(37-year, nine peak-to-peak cycles) mean growth per annum was 3.7%, with
a standard deviation of 3.7; in 1913-23, 1929-48, and 1969-81 (41-year,
nine peak-to-peak cycles) mean growth p.a. was 2.6%, with a standard devia-
tion of 7.2.6 In short, relatively high growth was apparently associated with
relatively low instability.
The relationship between long-term growth and cyclical variability is apt to
vary depending on their sources. No correspondence exists, for example, be-
tween the average growth rates and the relative duration of contractions. The
latter was historically lower on average in periods of long inflationary trends
than in periods of long deflationary trends (Zarnowitz and Moore 1986, pp.
525-31), but real growth was often weak in times of high inflation, as in
1913-23 and 1969-81.
6.4 Some International Comparisons
The evidence for the United States and othercountries in the postwar period
is consistent with the hypothesis that business cycles are less frequent and
milder when and where long-term real growth is higher. First, growth was
generally lower and cyclical instability greater in the second than in the first
halfof the postwar era. Second, economies that grew fast (notably Japan and
West Germany) had milder fluctuations than economies that grew more slowly
(notably the United States and United Kingdom).
In the 1950s and 1960s, France, Italy, West Germany, Japan, and a number
of smaller countries enjoyed extraordinarily high rates of economic growth.
World War II devastated the physical capital and wealth of these nations and
their initial postwar activity levels were very low, but their human capital was
much better preserved and hence their productive potential was high. Mone-
tary and fiscal reforms restored sound currencies and free markets, and polit-
ical reforms restored democratic values and institutions. The transitions from
closed, regimented, and inept systems to open, free, and efficient ones were
relatively smooth. Foreign aid helped in this historically unique process, and
foreign trade helped even more.
During this period, real growth in continental Europe and the Far East was
6. See chapter 7, table 7.1 and text, and Zamowitz and Moore 1986, table 9.11 and text, pp.
551-53, for detail.191 Trends and Fluctuations
interrupted infrequently and mostly by slowdowns rather than absolute de-
clines in overall economic activity. Thus, the benefits of high growth were
augmented by those ofhigh cyclical stability.
Figure 6.3 presents the evidence, based on composite indexes ofcoincident
indicators for eight countries. These indexes combine monthly and quarterly
measures of total output, industrial production, employment, real sales, and
inverted unemployment, and have trends equal to those of the corresponding
series for real GNP or GOP. The data are collected and processed by the Cen-
ter for International Business Cycle Research (CIBCR) at Columbia Univer-
sity Business School.
The black dots mark peaks and troughs of specific cycles in the indexes.
The so-identified declines last several (as a rule, 6 or more) months and have
amplitudes ofseveral or more percentage points (as a rule, at least 1%). They
presumably reflect business contractions. 7 The unfilled dots mark shorter and/
or smaller declines that do not qualify as recessions but may be associated
with significant retardations in general economic activity. However, substan-
tial business slowdowns can occur without any noticeable decreases in the
levels ofthe coincident indexes, particularly in places and times ofvery high
overall growth (e.g., West Germany, 1956-57, and Japan, 1957 and 1964).
The charts show some important similarities between the country indexes,
notably the concentration oflong expansions in the 1960s and 1980s, ofmild
recessions or slowdowns in the middle or later 1960s, and of more severe
contractions in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. But there are also pronounced
differences, which are clearly related in the main to longer growth trends. The
central point here is that high growth helps to reduce the frequency and depth
ofbusiness contractions.
Thus, according to these data (which for some countries begin only in the
mid-1950s), France had its first postwar recession in 1958-59, Italy in 1963-
65, West Germany in 1966-67, and Japan in 1973-75. Meanwhile, Canada,
United Kingdom, United States, and Australia, all countries that suffered
much smaller direct wartime damages, had less need ofdomestic reconstruc-
tion, lower growth rates, and earlier and more frequent recessions (fig. 6.3).
Economic growth slowed considerably everywhere during the 1970s and
1980s, and simultaneously business contractions became both more common
and more severe. They spread worldwide in 1974-75, after the first oil price
shock, and in 1980-82, after new OPEC cartel price hikes and strong coun-
terinflationary policy moves in the United States. In 1990-91, recessions
spread mainly in the English-speaking countries, following new tight-money
actions, the conflict over Kuwait, and the war with Iraq.
The economies ofthe United States and United Kingdom had relatively low
7. There is no NBER-type international reference chronology of business cycle peaks and

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s193 Trends and Fluctuations
rates ofreal growth and most cyclical variability. In sharp contrast, West Ger-
many and, particularly, Japan had both the highest growth rates and least cy-
clicality. Indeed, one can say that in Japan business cycles as we know them
were essentially absent. Although Japan's growth was much slower after the
mid-1970s than before, it still continued to be remarkably steady. The index
for France shows frequent but short and shallow declines, except in 1958-59
and 1974-75 (its sharp decline in the spring of 1968 reflects largely the con-
current political unrest).
In 1955-90, the longest common period covered, the number of complete
peak-to-peak cycles in the indexes were as follows: United States, six; United
Kingdom and Italy, five each; France and Australia, four each; Canada and
West Germany, three each; Japan, two. In all, the postwar business cycles
were shorter and more numerous in the United States than in any ofthe other
countries. An inspection ofthe charts suggests that this was mainly due to the
shorter durations of U.S. expansions. More generally, expansions differed
much more than contractions across the countries, in both length and ampli-
tude.
It is widely recognized that higher rates of saving-cum-investment in real
terms favor higher rates of growth. The most successful economies are those
that achieve the highest average long-term rates of investment in productive
capital, human and physical. Even though investment as measured in national
income accounts (i.e., investment in the physical capital of the business sec-
tor) has been much more cyclical than consumption, it is not necessarily true
that a larger share ofthis or a more comprehensive investment aggregate will
increase the fluctuations of the economy, along with its growth. Investment
can be both high and stable, provided it is a part of, and a response to, growth
in aggregate demand that is sufficient to keep the economy near full employ-
ment. 8
6.5 Are There Periodicities in Cyclical Behavior?
There is little evidence ofregularity in the durations ofbusiness expansions
and contractions inferred from the NBER studies ofhistorical annals and data
for the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. These numbers vary
greatly without suggesting any particular pattern. But they synthesize mea-
sures for a wide range ofconditions: major and minor cycles in times ofpeace
and war, different monetary regimes, and long inflationary and deflationary
trends. Some fluctuations are well documented in the data; others, mainly for
the more distant past, are not. So the apparent lack ofperiodicity could be an
artifact due to the aggregation over the different categories ofobserved cycles.
Moreover, it is possible for unobserved cycles of different durations to co-
8. Investment, broadly interpreted, is in the end only justified by growth in the demand for the
product ofthe new capital. Equally true, growth itselfdepends positively on prior rates ofinvest-
ment that enhances productivity and improves competitiveness. See Zamowitz 1991.194 Chapter Six
exist: there could be several ofthem, concurrent and interacting, each with its
own characteristic frequency. The observed movements would then be com-
posites of short and small subcycles, business cycles of larger and intermedi-
ate dimensions, and possibly "long waves" measured in decades rather than
years. To isolate the multiple periodicities hidden in the data, careful distinc-
tions and decomposition methods need to be applied.
However, this hypothesis is not supported by the data in any clear and con-
sistent way (chapter 8). Excluding the wartime episodes (which consist of
expansions of above-average length followed by contractions of below-
average length) reduces the variance ofdurations ofcyclical phases but not by
much. The few cycles with deep depressions typically followed by long and
large but not always vigorous expansions were certainly very different from
all others. Of course, a separate treatment of such outliers would produce
smaller variances for each of the resulting groups. But most of the NBER-
designated business cycles do not lend themselves to a clear-cut classification
into major and minor cycles. The longer cycles are not simply combinations
ofthe short ones, nor do the large and small fluctuations occur in any partic-
ular sequence over time. Durations and amplitudes ofcyclical movements are
likely to be correlated positively but not strongly. Convincing evidence ofthe
existence of long waves in economic growth is essentially lacking (Kondra-
tieff 1926 [1935]; Bums and Mitchell 1946, pp. 431-40; Garvy 1943; chapter
8, sec. 8.2.2, this volume). This is so not just because it is very difficult to
elicit the necessary information from time series that ,cover at most the two
and a half cycles dated by Kondratieff between 1790 and 1920 (most cover
only one or one and a half cycles). Support for the long-wave hypothesis
comes mainly from series on wholesale prices; it is very fragmentary and
weak for indicators ofreal economic activity.
The historical sequence of inflationary trends (1789-1814, 1843-64,
1896-1920) alternating with deflationary trends (1814-43, 1864-96, 1920-
32) reflects mainly the parallel long movements in the growth of money and
credit as related to gold discoveries, wars, and monetary regimes and policies.
Expansions tended to be longer relative to contractions in the periods ofrising
trends in prices than they were in periods of falling trends, but there is no
correlation between the long-term rates of growth and inflation, and none is
expected on theoretical grounds.
Some elements of limited and temporary periodicities emerge between the
1870s and 1930s, when major cycles are defined as being marked off by
troughs in severe contractions for both the United States and Britain. But no
deep depressions occurred after World War II, and the long-wave theory pre-
dicted a deflationary downswing at least since the later 1960s or early 1970s,
but none has materialized so far.
There are good reasons why no close and persistent periodicities exist in
the recurrent macroeconomic fluctuations. If they did, the turning points of
business cycles would presumably be easy to predict, but they are certainly195 Trends and Fluctuations
not. Downturns in particular are poor!y forecast (as demonstrated in part III
below). If they could be correctly anticipated with sufficient lead times, suc-
cessful actions might be undertaken to prevent or at least reduce socially
costly declines in total output and employment.
6.6 Does Detrending Reveal Regularities?
Chronologies of growth cycles, based on the consensus of fluctuations in
trend-adjusted series on aggregate output, employment, and other measures
of real economic activity, were first developed by Mintz (1969, 1972, 1974)
at the National Bureau. They were soon improved and extended to more coun-
tries by Moore and his associates at the CIBCR, where the international indi-
cators used in this analysis are kept up to date (Klein and Moore 1985; Moore
and Moore 1985). The basic methodology of identifying and dating cyclical
movements remains the same as in the traditional NBER analysis, with the
important difference that here it is applied to detrended series. However, as
already noted, trend and cycles influence each other in such ways that it is
impossible to separate the two without error, and the danger to guard against
is that the procedure may hide or distort more than it reveals.
Some major results of comparing business cycles and growth cycles are
clear and simple, however. Some slowdowns that interrupt long business
cycle expansions are sufficiently long and diffuse to give rise to additional
cyclical declines in the detrended aggregates when compared with the original
ones. Also, most postwar recessions were preceded by marked retardations.
Hence, growth cycles are on the whole shorter, more frequent, and more
nearly symmetrical than business cycles; they are less differentiated by dura-
tion but still quite variable. There is considerable correspondence between the
dates of postwar growth cycles in the principal industrialized economies of
North America, Europe, and the Far East (see chapter 7, sec. 7.4; chapter 8,
sec. 8.2.4; also Moore and Zarnowitz 1986, sec. 8).
As shown in section 6.4, slowdowns rather than recessions interrupted the
sharp growth trends during the early part of the postwar era in continental
Europe and Japan. Recessions reappeared there only in the mid-1960s or later
as the rebuilding was completed and the growth rates came down to their nor-
mal levels. Meanwhile the more slowly growing economies of the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom continued to experience recurrent
recessions, though they were generally mild. Detrending reduces all these
episodes to comparable growth cycles, but the international differences be-
tween the trends are important and should not be obscured, and the same
applies to the differences between cyclical slowdowns and contractions.
In short, growth cycles recur with greater frequency than business cycles
and are a feature ofeven those economies that expand at high rates and rarely
contract. They seem to be more alike-that is, more regular-than business
cycles. This is presumably because ofthe elimination oftrends that vary over196 Chapter Six
time and across the different variables and countries. Even so, growth cycles
exhibit much variability in durations and amplitudes. When figure 7.1 in
chapter 7 is updated, the following numbers are obtained, which indicate that
slowdowns without recession prevailed in Japan, West Germany, and Canada,
while slowdowns with recession prevailed in the United States, United King-
dom, and (slightly) France.9
u.s. Canada U.K. Germany France Japan
Slowdown, no recession 4 7 3 5 3 6
Slowdown and recession 7 5 5 3 4 2
Total 11 12 8 8 7 8
One reason why our knowledge ofhow trends and cycles interact is meager
is that much empirical work in macrodynamics uses methods that apply to
stationary series obtained by trend adjustment or differencing. Spectral anal-
ysis reveals periodicities at cyclical and shorter frequencies in all types of
U.S. fixed investment (log differences) and inventory investment (levels) in
both the interwar and the postwar periods. This does not support well the old
idea that fixed investment is the source ofmajor cycles, and inventory invest-
ment ofminor cycles. Rather, the results suggest the limitations ofthe method
but also, again, the likely diversity of cyclical experience (chapter 8, figs.
8.1-8.4).
6.7 Implications ofNonlinear Models
The fact that business cycles show no regularity in the durations of their
phases constitutes a strong argument against those models which, on the con-
trary, imply periodic fluctuations. A simple and strict example is provided by
the deterministic theory limited to a high accelerator-multiplier combination
and a constant rate ofautonomous real investment. With constant parameters,
this nonlinear or piecewise-linear model (the accelerator is suspended in the
downswing) will generate a periodic limit cycle. But it is in principle easy to
enlarge such a model and produce more diversity, for example, by allowing
for monetary influences and/or fluctuations in autonomous investment (Hicks
1950).
Other diverse examples of repetitive behavior include nonlinear models of
income-investment or profit-investment dynamics in a stationary economy
(Kaldor 1940; Kalecki 1971); a limit cycle in the labor market (Rose 1967);
and the "predator-prey" model of interacting fluctuations in employment,
wages, capital accumulation, and profits around an equilibrium path ofgrowth
(Goodwin 1967; Samuelson 1971). These models, too, are essentially illus-
9. This count does not include the 1990-91 recessions in the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom.197 Trends and Fluctuations
trative ofcertain particular ideas or mechanisms, and they remain fragmentary
and untested, though much explored mathematically. But extensions to in-
clude relationships with nominal and policy variables and stochastic elements
are likely to receive future attention, along with efforts at empirical implemen-
tation (from calibration to econometric tests). Nonlinear models are attractive
because they can generate undamped cyclical solutions, asymmetries, discon-
tinuities, and irreversibilities. In fact, as discussed in chapter 8, section 8.3,
this area of study has recently been very active. In addition to many papers
elaborating on the earlier ideas, monographs surveying the old and new theo-
ries and techniques have appeared (Gabisch and Lorenz 1987; Ferri and
Greenberg 1989).
Some of the above models are locally (piecewise) linear, and their overall
nonlinearity arises because of constraints (ceilings, floors, or both) or regime
switches at which changes in parameters or initial conditions are activated.
Others are explicitly nonlinear throughout and use mathematical tools ofclas-
sical nonlinear analysis. Both approaches produced endogenous models of
periodic cycles. The ability to generate business cycles without having to rely
on the deus ex machina ofoutside shocks was long viewed as a major advan-
tage by many theorists, whereas the need to move away from models ofperi-
odic replication was not sufficiently appreciated. And it seemed that the only
alternative to the elegant self-contained dynamics would indeed be the intro-
duction of some unexplained disturbances, time variation or shifts of some
parameters, and the like.
New analytical possibilities opened up with the discovery (in meteorology:
Lorenz 1963) of"deterministic chaos," that is, for certain nonlinear difference
equations changes in parameters can result in erratic, nonperiodic fluctuations
that need not converge to a cycle ofany order. Phases ofsharp oscillations can
follow upon or alternate irregularly with phases of relatively smooth growth
in ways that are completely unpredictable. Thus a model without any random
shocks is capable of generating behavior that "looks" stochastic. A small
cause (difference or error in initial conditions) may be associated eventually
with very large effects. In macroeconomic dynamics, examples of the emer-
gence of chaotic fluctuations are provided in the context of the Goodwin
model (Pohjola 1981), the classical and neoclassical growth models (Day
1982, 1983), and Keynesian models (Day and Shafer 1985).
The prospect of new lessons from new analytical approaches is generally
exciting, but as stated by Samuelson (1990, p. 57), "It will take very large
samples of time-series data to enable the scientist to refute the hypothesis of
chaos or to provisionally accept it. History-relevant history-is what we
economists are short on." The studies here considered are breaking new
ground, and it is impossible to predict where they will lead (the same applies
to the related exercises in "catastrophe theory" (see chapter 2, sec. 2.3.4).
Still, it is important to note the problems that are already apparent. The avail-
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linear feedbacks show hypothetical time series dominated by sharp saw-
toothed movements. Few economic time series look like that, and hardly any
comprehensive aggregates or indexes do. Business cycles are nonperiodic but
they consist offluctuations that are far more persistent and smooth. Economic
rationalizations for the shapes of the functions underlying the models ofcha-
otic behavior seem to be lacking. It is safe to conclude that the new paradigm
and techniques will influence economic theorizing about business cycles and
growth but represent no immediate threat to the prevailing type of stochastic
modeling and econometric work.
6.8 lYpes ofTheory and the Regularity ofBusiness Cycles
One can conceive of fluctuations caused by regularly recurring outside
events; such fluctuations would belong in the deterministic-exogenous class.
In such "forced oscillations" the driving factor is itselfcyclical and the system
responds passively. But it is hard to think of any external force that could
possibly dominate economic life to the point ofbeing responsible for business
cycles. Seasonal movements come to mind but they depend not only on the
more or less regular changes in weather but also on custom, economic deci-
sions, and random influences. Natural causes were invoked early to explain
business cycles but it soon became clear that such theories fail: whatever
drives the general expansions and contractions is almost certainly man-made
in the socioeconomic sense. This practically rules out theories that are both
deterministic and exogenous.
A counterargument might point to the possibility of government actions
designed to win elections that would somehow cause business cycles without
being themselves significantly affected by the recent or current changes in the
economy. But this is hardly a serious possibility, because policymakers both
react to the observed and expected changes and try to influence future macro-
economic conditions, whereas private individuals and organizations respond
to the past and anticipated government operations. Unanticipated policy ac-
tions themselves act as shocks to the public, although a good deal of what is
going on in the private economy is undoubtedly surprising to the government
as well. Models of"political business cycles" are useful to the extent that they
absorb these endogenous and stochastic elements.
The deterministic-endogenous class of theories is well represented. In the
early and mathematically well-articulated models of this type, nonlinearities
are required to keep the trajectories from exploding, because the moving equi-
librium or "steady state" is here intrinsically unstable; also, as already noted,
the cycles produced by these models are periodic-regular. These are not attrac-
tive features. The new chaos models are free ofthem but they are as yet short
on economic motivation and long on output that, though not explosive, shows
excessive volatility.
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clude the models with multiple rational expectations equilibria, in which ran-
dom events trigger generalized changes in expectations that become self-
fulfilling. The "sunspot" events need not effect any changes in economic
fundamentals. These theories increasingly center on financial market imper-
fections and crises and use techniques ofnonlinear dynamics (see collections
ofessays in Barnett, Geweke, and Shell 1989; and Semmler 1989).
Stochastic and exogenous theories are currently the best known and most
dominant in the literature. In this case, the equilibrium is intrinsically stable,
and continuing outside shocks are needed to produce recurrent fluctuations.
The prototype for linear business cycle models of this type is Frisch 1933, a
pre-Keynesian dynamic model of cyclical motion (not growth). Frisch's idea
that random "impulses" keep fluctuations alive even though the undisturbed
economy (his "propagation mechanism") is highly dampened established a
tradition for many subsequent theoretical and almost all active macroecono-
metric models. 10
The magnitude of the white-noise shocks impinging on the so-represented
economy is the main determinant of the amplitude of the resulting fluctua-
tions, whereas the length of the latter and the tendency toward dampening
depend primarily on the parameters of the propagation mechanism (Frisch
1933, p. 171). Other things equal, the less dampened the system, the more
distinct will be the periodicity ofthe generated cycles. This is the case of"free
oscillations," which arise in a system that responds cyclically to impulses that
are themselves noncyclical.
The original stochastic-exogenous cycle analysis worked with white-noise
shocks only. Serially correlated disturbances would result in smoother and
more markedly periodic movements. Sufficiently large sporadic or clustered
shocks could affect the timing ofturning points and the duration ofa business
cycle.
It is instructive to think of the pure types of theory but they are not all
mutually preclusive, and it stands to reason that the business cycles ofthe real
world include elements ofthese theories in various combinations. For the cen-
tral phenomenon to exist, a set ofrelationships possessing considerable regu-
larity is necessary; but for the manifestations in time of this phenomenon to
be variable, the balance of forces acting on and within the system must be
changing. The more endogenously business cycles can be explained, the bet-
ter in principle; but some parts ofthe big picture must be left exogenous ifthe
10. In the Frisch model, output of capital goods is a distributed-lag function of orders that
depend on the change in consumption, which is inversely related to a weighted total outputofboth
consumption and capital goods. Thus technology, the acceleration principle, and an equation
based on the notion that consumption yields to cash pressure as money supply lags behind money
demand are all linked to production and income. Recent simulations confirm that random shocks
can produce considerable fluctuations in this model but not excessive periodicity for parameter
values that Frisch favored, that is, for a relatively high degree ofdampening. See Thalberg 1990,
where it is shown that adding a multiplier relation improves the results ofthe model qualitatively
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explanation is to be economic and comprehensible. Some influences that are
identifiably important are external to the economy, and some ofthese may be
essentially random. Linear approximations will do well locally in many cases
but not globally everywhere. The general fluctuations may be "free" but some
particular relations within the economy probably reflect "forced" cyclical
movements.
6.9 Simulations with Macroeconometric Models
The 1955 Klein-Goldberger model of the U.S. economy estimated on an-
nual data for 1929-52 was intensively studied by Adelman and Adelman
(1959), who found it to be essentially noncyclical in the absence of shocks.
Stochastic simulations with random shocks to extrapolated values of the ex-
ogenous variables also did not generate significant fluctuations, but simula-
tions with random shocks to the fitted equations of the model did. Adelman
and Adelman compared the time paths ofthe latter with the NBER reference
cycle patterns for the variables in question and found considerable similari-
ties. They concluded that these results are consistent with the concept of an
economy that is a dynamically stable system that propagates outside distur-
bances into business cycles (the Wicksell-Slutsky-Frisch hypothesis). Despite
caveats by the authors about limitations of the model and method used, their
findings have at times been taken as a proofthat the origin ofbusiness cycles
is truly stochastic.
However, detailed tests of an array ofmuch more elaborate quarterly mac-
roeconomic models reject the classical version of the Frisch theory, namely,
that purely random shocks are necessary and sufficient to cause cyclical fluc-
tuations in the estimated systems. A comprehensive study ofthree large-scale
models (Wharton, Commerce Department, and FRB-MIT-Penn) found that
they were all noncyclical in deterministic forms and also did not reproduce
continuous cyclical developments when subjected to random disturbances
(Zarnowitz, Boschan, and Moore 1972). In chapter 9, which is a brief sum-
mary of that study, some similar results for a fourth model (Brookings) are
also included. When correlated shocks were used, smoother and more distinct
fluctuations resulted, but even these were much weaker than those observed
in the historical series used in the estimation of the models. Consistent evi-
dence comes from several other contributions to the NBER conference that
produced these simulation studies (Hickman 1972).
It is possible that a combination of random shocks to both the exogenous
and the behavioral variables would perform better than either kind of shock
alone and, also, that mixing correlated and uncorrelated disturbances would
help (Adelman 1972, p. 535). Wars, strikes, technological innovations, gov-
ernment policy, and political developments, etc., are potential sources oftem-
poral persistence in exogenous factors; they will inevitably impart some serial
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situation is unfortunately blurred by the very real possibility that the results of
the simulations reflect in significant measure misspecification errors in the
models. For example, the inadequate cyclicality of the long stochastically
simulated trajectories could be partly due to insufficient nonlinear elements in
the models.
The Hickman (1972) volume was followed by comparative studies ofecon-
ometric model performance that were concerned more with forecasting accu-
racy and multiplier analysis but added some evidence on the cyclical problem
under examination here (Klein and Burmeister 1976). The Michigan quarterly
model is described as one that "will not produce a sustained cyclical path in
non-stochastic simulations with 'smooth' exogenous variables" (Hymans and
Shapiro 1976, p. 268). The mechanism ofresponse to outside shocks is highly
dampened, and dynamic simulations show generally smaller amplitudes than
the corresponding actual series. The authors argue that this is as it should be,
to the extent that recessions, booms, high inflation, etc., represent unique or
abberrant behavior patterns.
Similarly, in the Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), model relatively smooth paths
characterize simulations that removed many exogenous and random influ-
ences by holding constant the growth rates of fiscal variables, nonborrowed
reserves, etc. (Eckstein, Green, and Sinai 1976). It is asserted that "the mod-
el's endogenous structure should display the strongly damped oscillatory
character that the economy seems to possess" (p. 212; emphasis added). But
"noise" defined narrowly to include only the (presumably random) equation
errors accounted for very little (only 7.4%) ofthe total "cyclicality" (an index
ofrelative deviations from trend) in the more recent version ofthe DRI model
(Eckstein and Sinai 1986, pp. 70-73, 81). This may be largely attributable to
the use of many special, or dummy, variables in the very large and difficult-
to-evaluate DRI model. Be that as it may, the macroeconometric evidence
lends more support to the hypothesis ofthe importance ofexogenous variables
than to the hypothesis ofpure random shocks.
6.10 A Note on the Recent History ofThese Models
The late 1960s and early 1970s represent the heyday of the application of
comprehensive econometric models to macroeconomic analysis and forecast-
ing. Since then, the econometricians and their models came to be criticized
for not dealing well with the short-term effects and future implications of
commodity and oil price shocks (which were, understandably, unanticipated).
More important, they were seen as unprepared for the concurrence of rising
inflation and severe recessions that materialized in 1972-80. This failure has
been widely shared in the profession and attributed to Keynesian theory and
policy generally, but the ambitiously large and complex models presented a
particularly visible target for criticism. Moreover, with the advent of the ra-
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that changes in policy regimes alter private expectations and behavior so as to
invalidate certain key equations in the models that are wrongly treated as fixed
(Lucas 1976).
These developments led to a sharp decline in the interest ofacademic econ-
omists in the existing and commercially active macroeconometric models.
The influential Lucas critique met with the valid counterclaim that shifts in
policy rules are very rare and normal policy actions have no disruptive effects
on important macrorelationships (Sims 1982). Whether and how rational ex-
pectations apply is itself a matter of dispute (see chapter 2). Some of the de-
fense ofthe models by their builders (Eckstein 1981) finds support in the data
and some of the criticism does not. But the large-scale models no longer in-
spire the confidence and hopes they once did, their limitations are widely rec-
ognized, and even many friendly critics view them as overdeveloped and un-
derexplained.
It is also true, however, that the models continue to be used with commer-
cial success for practical purposes offorecasting and consulting. As such they
are being almost continuously reexamined and repaired, but little is known
about precisely how and with what effects. The estrangement between the
academic economists and the practitioners in the econometric bureaus per-
sists. This can hardly be a healthy state ofaffairs, since it is likely that the two
sides have much to learn from each other.
Alternative simulations and forecasts with different macroeconometric
models are useful devices in the search for good questions and answers on
what is expected and unexpected and what is self-produced and externally
caused in the economy's motion. Yet, to my knowledge, little work ofthe type
discussed here and in chapter 9 has been done more recently. No major new
models have been developed, and the documentation on the revisions of the
commercial models is not publicly available. The lessons from the reported
simulations and tests are worthwhile and need to be extended.